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A new series of Election Analyses is
now available from the LSE’s Centre
for Economic Performance (CEP).
The series will discuss the research
evidence on some of the key policy
battlegrounds of the 2010 General
Election, including macroeconomic
policy, immigration, health,
education, crime, poverty and
inequality, labour market policy,
regional policy, energy and the
environment, financial regulation and
bankers’ bonuses, and foreign aid.
The financial meltdown of 2008 led to
the worst recession experienced by
the UK and other advanced
economies since the Great
Depression. The latest Election
Analysis from the Centre for
Economic Performance (CEP) – by
Professors Luis Garicano and John
Van Reenen – examines what went wrong with the regulatory system for finance and how can it
be fixed.
The publication is summarised below and can be found in full on the CEP website
here: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/series.asp?prog=CEPEA
The Great Recession of 2008-2010 had its roots in the crisis of financial markets,
which spread to the real economy.
The structural problem with the financial sector is that there is strong ‘contagion’
between institutions within the financial sector and also between the financial sector
and other parts of the economy. A large bank can pull down the financial sector,
which can, in turn, pull down large parts of the rest of the economy in a ‘domino
effect’.
Because of these contagion effects, governments will inevitably bail out banks; and
because banks know this, they take excessive risks. This structural ‘moral hazard’
problem has not been dealt with by the existing regulatory regime.
To deal with the problem, we need to (a) make bankruptcy more credible; (b) shrink
the size of banks so that there are fewer organisations that are ‘too big to fail’; and
(c) improve existing regulations in a variety of ways.
Most current proposals do not deal with this fundamental problem. Improving corporate governance,
reforming bankers’ pay and crude taxes on all banks and/or financial transactions are mainly
distractions.
Without reform, the risks of a repeat of a repeat financial crisis have increased. There is LESS
uncertainty that governments will bail out banks, and key sectors like investment banking are more
concentrated.
Co-author Professor Luis Garicano concludes:
‘The fundamental regulatory problem in the financial system is that the government will bail out the banks
because of the risk of contagion from organisations that are ‘too big to fail’ to the rest of the economy.’
‘This structural ‘moral hazard’ problem causes large financial firms to take excessive risks.’
‘To deal with this we have to operate on the fundamental problem, which means increasing the real threat of
bankruptcy and shrinking down the organisations that pose such systemic risks.’
‘We should not get distracted by reforms such as changes in corporate governance, bankers’ pay, bank
levies, Tobin taxes or competition inquiries.’
